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Integration
FLORINA CRISTIANA (CRIS) MATEI*
ABSTRACT This article reviews Romania’s intelligence reform after 1989. Specifically,
it looks at intelligence reform before and after Romania’s accession to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004, and the European Union (EU) in 2007. It
finds that Romania has made considerable progress in intelligence reform. That is
because Romania, which expressed its desire and commitment to join NATO/EU after
1989, has worked hard to comply with these organizations’ membership demands
(including intelligence reform). After NATO/EU integration (when demands on
balancing control and effectiveness virtually vanished), despite continued openness
efforts made by agencies, control/oversight diluted. Thus, post-NATO/EU, while
effectiveness is being strengthened, democratic control lessens.
Introduction
This article reviews Romania’s efforts to reform its intelligence agencies after
the transition to democracy in December 1989, before and after integration
into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union
(EU) in 2004 and 2007, respectively. First, it briefly depicts the role of
intelligence during the non-democratic regime. Then, it provides a
description of Romania’s endeavors to balance democratic civilian control
of its postcommunist intelligence apparatus with effectiveness, before and
after accession to NATO and EU. The paper continues with an analysis of the
status of reform, which utilizes a conceptual framework proposed by Thomas
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C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei for the study of Civil–Military
Relations (CMR), followed by conclusions.1
Romania is a relatively new democracy, which transitioned violently from
one of the most oppressive communist dictatorships in Central and Eastern
Europe to a democratic society.2 It is now a full member of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, and EU, as well as a
security partner to many other countries and organizations. Its path to a free
society has been protracted and burdensome but, despite a series of
limitations and even temporary failures in democratic institution building,
Romania has developed basic democratic institutions from scratch.
Institutionalizing democratic reform of intelligence has been a key
component of the overall democratic reform process. Toward this end,
Romania has been undergoing a major review and reform of the central
institutions involved in national security, defense, and intelligence, seeking to
achieve democratic civilian control/transparency and effectiveness of the
intelligence agencies created after the end of communist dictatorship.
Specifically, Romania has strived to institutionalize and develop the following
requirements for democratic reform of intelligence: establish standards and
procedures for democratic civilian control and oversight of the intelligence
agencies; consolidate the democratic nature of this control through explicit
mechanisms; and, develop relevant expertise and capacities to support
intelligence activities (to include organizational reform, openness to new
roles and missions, and removing the ‘systemic impurities’ from the
authoritarian past).3
Two decades after the end of the Cold War, Romania has made
considerable progress in intelligence reform. After the 1989 Revolution,
Romania worked hard to comply with the membership demands of the
1For a thorough discussion on the reasons why intelligence reform can be considered an
element of civil–military relations, see Bruneau and Tollefson, Who Guards the Guardians
(Austin: University of Texas Press 2006); Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz (eds.)
Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness (Austin:
University of Texas Press 2007). The conceptual framework, which consists of a trinity of
democratic civilian control, effectiveness, and efficiency (fulfilling the assigned roles and
missions at a minimum cost) of the armed forces, police, and intelligence agencies, will be
described in detail later in this paper. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei,
‘Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations’,
Democratization 15/5 (2008) pp.909–29; and Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana
Matei (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Civil Military Relations (London: Routledge 2012).
2Freedom House score for Romania in 2011 was 3.36, on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing
the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. See,http://www.freedomhouse.org/
report/nations-transit/2012/romania. . Nevertheless, due to the political crises occurred in
2012, including the fall of the Boc and Ungureanu cabinets in winter and spring, respectively,
and the impeachment of the President in the summer, as well as continuous political infighting,
it is to be seen if the score changes in the following years, thus whether or not Romania’s
democracy is in danger.
3Timothy Edmunds, ‘Intelligence Agencies and Democratisation: Continuity and Change in
Serbia after Miloševic’, Europe-Asia Studies 60/1 (2008) pp.25–48.


































European and Euro-Atlantic collective security organizations. Under these
circumstances, a glance at Romania’s intelligence reform today should
capture a more or less ‘poised’ balance between transparency, account-
ability, and democratic control, on the one hand, and effectiveness, on the
other hand. Yet, the balance is more inclined toward effectiveness, and less
toward accountability and democratic control. Admittedly, before NATO/
EU integration, despite decision/policy makers’ limited expertise and
knowledge in intelligence and intelligence reform, there had been more
(outside driven) interest, willingness, and focus on democratic control and
oversight, in order to secure Romania’s full membership in the two
organizations. And when/if Romania stumbled, did not undertake rigorous
reforms, or when wrongdoing happened in the intelligence realm, civil
society and the media stepped in to expose these problems to both national
and international public (including NATO/EU), ultimately coercing the
government to continue reform. However, after NATO/EU integration
(when demands on balancing control and effectiveness virtually vanished)
and despite continued efforts toward transparency and openness by several
intelligence agencies (which will be addressed later in this article), Romania
still lacks improved accountability and better functioning control/oversight
mechanisms of intelligence. Interest and political will are scarce, although
expertise and knowledge are increasing among outsiders, including policy
makers.
Background on the Communist Dictatorship and Transition to Democracy
Between 1947 and 1989, Romania was a highly repressive communist
dictatorship; the intelligence apparatus4 was enshrouded by virtually total
secrecy, concealing law breaking and abuses against Romanian citizens,
living both in the country and abroad, in order to defend the regime in power.
The hardship and cruelties of the communist-era intelligence apparatus had
become even more prominent after dictator Nicolae Ceausescu took power in
1965; by 1989, when the regime ended, Ceausescu’s political police, the
Securitate, had become so powerful that it successfully installed an
omnipresent state of fear in Romania.5
4Consisting of the General Directorate of State Security (DGSS), established in 1951, which
was transformed by Ceausescu in the late 1960s into the Department of State Security (DSS),
also known as the Securitate. It should be noted that within the DSS functioned the
Department of External Information (DIE), which was Romania’s main foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence organization. See,http://www.sie.ro/En/index_e.html. and,http://
www.ceausescu.org/ceausescu_texts/revolution/die.htm. .
5For detailed information on the Securitate’s role in defending Ceausescu and his regime, see
the following: Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant, Security Intelligence Services in New
Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania (London: Palgrave 2001); Cristiana
Matei, ‘Romania’s Transition to Democracy and the Role of the Press in Intelligence Reform’,
in Bruneau and Boraz (eds.) Reforming Intelligence; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei,
‘Romania’s Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving
Democracy’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20/4 (2007)


































In December 1989, Romania transitioned to democracy by abolishing the
communist regime, killing Ceausescu, and dismantling the Securitate.6 Since
then, Romania has been able to craft a new intelligence system (which
initially consisted of at least nine agencies) within a legal framework
including defined mandates, and democratic civilian control/oversight, as
well as being tailored to the current security environment with its risks,
challenges, and threats. Today there are six intelligence agencies:7 four
independent – the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI); the Foreign
Intelligence Service (SIE); the Guard and Protection Service (SPP); the
Special Telecommunication Service (STS) – and two ministerial –
Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection (DIPI); the Directorate
for General Information of the Armed Forces (DGIA). Reforming intelligence
in Romania has followed two directions: one required by democratization –
the need for accountability, openness, transparency, and democratic civilian
control; and the other drawn by security trends – the need to utilize effective
intelligence to counter current security challenges such as terrorism,
organized crime, and cyber threats.
Democratic Reform of Romania’s Intelligence Agencies
This comprehensive institutional and organizational democratic reform,
driven by both an initial need for intelligence transparency and a subsequent
need for effectiveness, has essentially known two main phases (pre- and
post-NATO/EU integration), with several (overlapping) stages.
Phase 1: Pre-NATO/EU Integration
The first phase, the pre-NATO/EU accession, included roughly three stages,
and aimed at establishing democratic intelligence institutions, hence a
particular interest in democratic control and oversight, as well as openness, to
ensure a move away from the dictatorial past, and secure full NATO and EU
membership.
The first stage was a ‘wake up’ period lasting from December 1989 to
1991, which was mostly dominated by ad hoc and often perfunctory
measures involving intelligence, such as the dismantling of the Securitate,
creation of the SIE and SRI (February andMarch 1990, respectively), the SPP
(May 1990), as well as the creation of the Intelligence Agency of the Ministry
pp.629–60; Larry Watts, ‘Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania’, Geneva
Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Working Papers, 2003.
6The Securitate was placed under the Armed Forces in December 1989. Romania reportedly
functioned without an intelligence organization for at least three months after the end of
dictatorship. A new intelligence system was created in March 1990, however on the ruins of
the Securitate.
7It should be noted that the CSAT created a National Intelligence Community in November
2005, and the Prime Minister created a Center for Situations in his chancellery, which will be
discussed later in this article.


































of Interior (February 1990). This stage was characterized by several
controversies including the establishment of intelligence and security
institutions without a proper legal framework, or the reactivation and
appointment of the former Securitate officers in several agencies (but most
importantly in the Ministry of Interior).8 Interestingly, during this stage, two
committees for defense, public order and national security were created
within both chambers of Parliament and quickly (May 1990) empowered
with a host of prerogatives including: adoption of laws pertaining to
intelligence; the control, review of the budget, and assessment of the draft
budgetary allocations; investigations to be conducted through either
permanent committees or special committees of investigations, interpella-
tions, and questions; simple motions and censorship motions.9 Nevertheless,
legislative control/oversight of the committees was derelict during this
stage.10
The second stage was an ‘institution building’ period, lasting from
February/March 1991 to 1996/1997 during which Romania established
several institutions aimed at developing democratically accountable
intelligence agencies. Examples include the following: establishing the
National Defense Supreme Council (CSAT) (1991) as the main executive
control mechanism, as well as national security and defense coordinator;
creating the National Defense College (NDC) (1992) to provide defense
education for military personnel as well as civilians within the military system
and outsiders; and shaping and improving the legal basis for security and
intelligence by drafting and adopting several laws and government
resolutions on defense and security matters, including a new Constitution
(1991), National Security Law (1991), and statutory laws for several agencies
(e.g. STS 1996). This stage is also marked by the first attempts to
professionalize intelligence agencies: hiring young generations of personnel,
mostly graduates from universities or representatives of civil society, with
8For more information, see the following: Matei, ‘Romania’s Transition to Democracy and the
Role of the Press in Intelligence Reform’ in Bruneau and Boraz (eds.) Reforming Intelligence;
Matei, ‘Romania’s Intelligence Community’, pp.629–60; Liviu Muresan, ‘Security Sector
Reform – A Chance for the Euro-Atlantic Integration of Romania’, paper prepared for a
Workshop on Security Sector Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Criteria for Success and
Failure sponsored by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF),
Geneva, Switzerland, 22–23 November 2001, pp.2–3; Williams and Deletant, Security
Intelligence Services in New Democracies; Watts, ‘Control and Oversight of Security
Intelligence in Romania’.
9Razvan Ionescu and Liviu Muresan, ‘The Monitoring Exercise of Instruments and
Mechanisms for Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in Romania’ (pilot project)
of the EURISC Foundation, the Commission for Defense, Public Order and National Security
of the House of Deputies, Parliament of Romania, and with the support of Geneva Centre for
the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Bucharest, Romania, 2004, p.23;
Constantin Monac, ‘Parlamentul si Securitatea Nationala’, Bucharest, Monitorul Oficial,
2006, pp.191–3; Williams and Deletant, Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies.
10Even if, due to the public fear for a Securitate comeback, SRI reported to Parliament in
November 1990; Watts, ‘Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania’.


































pro-Western attitudes and generally flawless conduct;11 improving personnel
management policies, and providing intelligence professionals with a career
path based on motivation and a promotion system based more on merit and
performance.12 There was investment in intelligence education
and professional training through the creation of the Romanian National
Intelligence Academy (ANI)13 (1992), as well as other education and training
institutions, which educate future intelligence agents in specific intelligence
issues, foreign languages/cultures, legal matters, as well as technical skills.14
Relevant to civilian control/oversight of the military intelligence was the
appointment (1993) of the first two civilians in command positions within the
military system (a deputy director of the National Defense College and a
deputy Minister of Defense), as well as the appointment of the first civilian as
Minister of Defense (1994). In addition, through the adoption of the
National Security Law in 1991, judicial oversight was established.
All of these developments were possible due to NATO/EU pressure to bring
about institutions and mechanisms of democratic civilian control of
intelligence. NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the EU’s Acquis
Communautaire served as guides to intelligence reform. Their requirements
included: establishing democratic control, achieving interoperability and
compatibility with the Atlantic Alliance’s members, and harmonization of
domestic legislation with the Western countries. Nevertheless, Romania’s
then lackadaisical pace of intelligence reform halted (together with other
reform challenges) Romania’s accession in the first wave of enlargement of
the Atlantic Alliance in 1997. For instance, the continued employment of
former Securitate employees – in particular those who were corrupted, did
political policing roles, and violated human rights – because of the desire to
maintain expertise15 was a drawback for the reform,16 and hence for
Romania’s chances of NATO and EU membership.17 In addition, democratic
11There were situations, however, when conduct was far from flawless: intelligence personnel
were engaged in numerous acts of corruption and bad behavior.
12Interview by Ion Petrescu with General Lieutenant dr Sergiu Medar, Observatorul Militar,
no. 45, 9–15 November 2005.
13Initially known as the ‘Superior Intelligence Institute’; Florina Cristiana Matei, ‘Shaping
Intelligence as a Profession in Romania: Reforming Intelligence Education after 1989’,
Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS) Research Paper 110, p.20
,http://rieas.gr/images/rieas110.pdf.
14For detailed information on intelligence education and training, see ibid.
15The need for continuity in specific intelligence fields and areas of expertise, or lack of
expertise of the newly hired agents; ‘Rolul Serviciilor de Informaţii intr-o Societate
Democratică si in Procesul de Aderare a Romaniei la NATO’, Special Edition broadcast by
Romanian Television, 23 March 2002 ,http://www.sie.ro/Arhiva/es2.html. .
16Early retirement of the former Securitate employees was also problematic. Without a legal
basis on the statute of intelligence officers, many of them became the first generation of
Romanian (corrupt) businessmen, while others created parallel private intelligence agencies
(competing with the government institutions); these personnel helped expand corruption and
organized crime.
17With regard to protection of classified information.


































civilian control was also less than perfect. With regard to legislative control/
oversight, for instance, despite the relatively great authority granted to the
parliamentary committees, actual parliamentary oversight has been
challenged by deficient parliamentary expertise in intelligence matters,
poor cooperation and coordination among parliamentary committees as well
as between former and current members of the oversight committees, and the
unhelpful stance of the intelligence agencies when requested to forward
information and data to committees.
The third stage, lasting from 1996/1997 to 2004, the moment of
NATO integration, involved more sustained and comprehensive reforms,
to secure accession in the second wave of enlargement, encompassing
the following: institutionalizing security policies; improving recruitment
and human resource management of the agencies so as to include a
vetting process and granting security clearances; consolidating the
professionalization of intelligence; demilitarization of Police (including
DIPI); developing legislation and a system for protecting classified
information;18 and modernization of equipment, especially regarding
military and technical intelligence. Interagency coordination and
cooperation, as well as international cooperation was fostered, especially
in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of Washington, DC, and New
York in 2001.19 Legislation on transparency and access to Government
information, for example, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was
adopted in 2001, as well as legislation enabling the opening of
Securitate files (a Law on access to Securitate files was adopted in
1999). More effective openness and transparency endeavors included
creating websites to reach out to civil society and the public; press
18Especially to alleviate NATO concerns. NATO expressed it unwillingness to share
information with former Securitate personnel; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, ‘The Challenges
of Intelligence Sharing in Romania’, Intelligence and National Security, 24/4 (2009) pp.574–
85; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, ‘The Legal Framework for Intelligence in Post-Communist
Romania’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 22 (2009) pp.667–
98; Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas Bruneau, ’Intelligence Reform in New Democracies:
Factors Supporting or Arresting Progress’,Democratization 18/3 (2011) pp.602–30; Thomas
C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, ‘Intelligence in the Developing Democracies:
The Quest for Transparency and Effectiveness’, in Loch K. Johnson (ed.) The Oxford
Handbook of National Security Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010).
19Although executive control, guidance, and coordination of the intelligence existed through
CSAT, in 2001 CSAT strengthened executive control by empowered the Prime Minister to
exercise control over all the intelligence services during crises; until that time, the Prime
Minister would normally only have jurisdiction over the ministerial services, while only the
President would coordinate all other agencies. See Radu Tudor, ‘Romanian Government to
Revamp Intelligence Services Structures’, Ziua, 16 November 2001. This was a very
interesting development. In Romania, which is a semi-parliamentary system, there have
always been political struggles between the President and the Prime Minister, with regard to
the allocation of intelligence and security. The empowering of the Prime Minister showed
mutual consent to set aside divergences and dissent toward a bigger goal: NATO/EU
integration.


































conferences, news briefings, as well as regular interviews in the media
were given by intelligence officials, not only from SIE and SRI, but also
from the military intelligence, SPP, STS all contributed to consolidating
institutions of democratic civilian control and oversight. During this
period, an important stimulus for reform was the 1999-adopted NATO
Membership Action Plans (MAP). Another catalyst for transparency was
the European Court for Human Rights (ECHR), which was established
in 1959 in Strasbourg to handle alleged violations of the 1950 European
Convention on Human Rights.20 Relevant examples of the ECHR’s
contribution to the oversight of the Romanian intelligence agencies
include the Court’s resolution on the Aurel Rotaru versus Romania case
in 2000, and on Nicolae Haralambie versus Romania case in 2009. In
both cases, the Court voted in favor of the plaintiffs: in Rotaru’s case,
the Court voted the Romanian government violated Articles 13 (the
right to an effective remedy), 6 (the right to a fair trial), and 8 (the right
to respect for private life) of the Convention; in Haralambie’s case, the
Court ruled Haralambie was a victim of a breach in Article 8 of the
Convention, namely obstruction and delay to access the file created on
him by the Securitate.21
All of this, but most importantly Romania’s support to the United States’
security endeavors, as well as its involvement in the war in Afghanistan,
enabled it to receive an invitation to join NATO in 2002, at the Prague
Summit, and full accession in 2004, at theWashington Summit. Nevertheless,
despite the fact that the new legal framework stipulates political neutrality,
politicization of some intelligence agencies (and abuses of agencies’
exceptional powers, which have, from time to time, been used for vendettas
and personal reasons, rather than national security) still happened
throughout this stage.
Phase 2: Post-NATO/EU Integration
The second phase (2004–present) has involved the transformation of
Romania’s military to full NATO and EU (in 2007) membership, in terms
of continued transparency and openness,22 and increased effectiveness.
20Any state or individual claiming to be a victim of a violation of the Convention has the right
to forward an application to the ECHR alleging an infringement by one of the Convention
states of any of the Convention’s rights; Matei, ‘Romania’s Intelligence Community’, pp.629–
60; Ian Leigh, ‘Intelligence and the Law in the United Kingdom’ in Loch K. Johnson (ed.) The
Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010).
21Both Rotaru and Haralambie were awarded considerable amounts of money for
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. In the Rotaru case, ECHR recommended changes in
the legislation on intelligence. For detailed information on the two cases, see Matei,
‘Romania’s Intelligence Community’, pp.629–60; ,http://sim.law.uu.nl/sim/caselaw/Hof.
nsf/233813e697620022c1256864005232b7/4f263165e3595d32c125765b003237da?
OpenDocument. .
22Democratic control, in particular legislative, appears to have lessened after 2007.


































With regard to transparency, the completion of the transfer of Securitate
files’ to the Council for Studying Securitate Archives (CNSAS),23 between
2004–7 (the year of accession into EU), has led to opening and making
public on request of thousands of files, whereby various politicians,
academics, intellectuals, sports men and women, clergy members, and
journalists have been exposed as Securitate collaborators. Again, EU’s
pressure toward openness and transparency should be credited for this
accomplishment. In addition, almost all intelligence agencies have
continued to improve their outreach to civil society and the citizenry,
from making their websites more user friendly, to participating in talk
shows, interviews, and round tables, alongside NGOs, think tanks, and
press representatives. They have contributed to the minimal intelligence
culture and literature in Romania with books on security threats,
intelligence roles and missions in a democracy, and journals like DGIA’s
Infosfera or SRI’s Intelligence. In this context, in 2010, the author chaired
a panel entitled ‘Intelligence Reform and Outreach in Romania’ at the
International Studies Association (ISA) Convention, in Montreal, Canada,
which brought together intelligence practitioners from two Romanian
intelligence agencies (SRI and DGIA), including the SRI deputy director,
and Romanian academia. They familiarized the participants with current
intelligence reform issues in Romania, such as improving analysis,
interagency and international cooperation and sharing, and openness/
transparency to society, while also seeking out input from these developed
democracies on how to tackle these issues. In addition, the ISA papers
written by Romanian intelligence professionals were published by
intelligence journals in the United States.
Moreover, the Romanian government strove to improve the agencies’
effectiveness. A National Doctrine on Security Intelligence was adopted
in 2004, a White Book on Security and Defense was developed in 2004, a
new National Security Strategy in 2005, a Defense Strategy in 2008,
which established new priorities and stipulated additional roles and
missions for intelligence, in particular with regard to combating
terrorism. Romania’s National Intelligence Community (CNI), was
created in 2005 to serve as the coordination body of the activity of all
current intelligence agencies and to provide centralized processing of
intelligence gathered by all its components, and dissemination to relevant
consumers.24 Despite criticism and concern vis-à-vis transparency and
23CNSAS is a lawful authority set up by a law adopted in 1999 on access to former Securitate,
to apprehend the Securitate files from agencies, facilitate Romanians’ access to personal
records and, most importantly, to examine the past Securitate connections of prominent public
authorities.
24‘Romania: Secret Services to Solve the Problems of Integration in EU’, Axis, 23 January
2006; MirunaMunteanu and Razvan Ionescu, ‘Reforma serviciilor secrete romanesti, capcane
si jaloane, CNI – o noua viziune asupra informatiilor (2)’, Ziua, 14 January 2006; Dan Badea,
‘Comunitatea Nationala de Informatii infiintata de Traian Basescu este in afara legii’,
Gardianul, 24 November 2005.


































accountability issues,25 CNI seems to serve its purpose to a certain
extent:26 it increases intelligence agencies’ effectiveness and profession-
alism by eliminating parallelisms and waste of human and material
resources, and generates a functional intelligence partnership with the
agencies preserving their specific roles and missions while enjoying better
coordination of their strategic activities based on professional rather than
unfair competition. In 2007, SRI started, with CSAT’s approval, a
comprehensive reform entitled SRI ‘Strategic Vision 2007–2010’, which
comprised de-bureaucratization, improved flexibility, and better horizon-
tal cooperation among SRI structures, strengthened analysis capabilities,
and the like. The Strategic Vision was in line with EU security strategy
and NATO’s new strategic concept. Reform is still going on within SRI.
‘Strategic Vision 2007–2011’ is currently followed by ‘Strategic Vision
2011–2015. SRI in the Information Age’, which attempts to better link
the Romanian intelligence agency with the current technological,
informational, and cyber security actors. In addition, intelligence agencies
have continued to receive increased budget funds, a most recent increase
happened in stages, in March 2011for SIE and STS and May for SRI.27
To better suit the current security landscape and the new NATO/EU
membership statute, the executive drafted a new security law package in
2005, including a law on the status of intelligence officers, a law on the
organization and functioning of the SIE, a law on the organization and
functioning of the SRI, a law on national security, and a law on activity of
intelligence, counterintelligence, and protection of information. Unfortu-
nately, despite the real need for updated legislation on security, since the
drafting of these laws, despite debates, adjustments, and changes of the
respective draft laws, Parliament failed to approve the package, and does not
seem to have any immediate intent to do so. For instance, the refusal in early
2011 of the European Union to allow Romania’s accession to the Schengen
Agreement, which pressures Romania to strengthen institutions dealing with
border security, as well as to eradicate and counter corruption within security
institutions and throughout the Government, requires upgrading and
strengthening the legal framework for national security. Yet, the legislators
do not seem to show any interest in it.
Controversial during this phase have been the repeated accusations that
Romania hosted secret CIA prisons (also known as ‘black sites’) at the
beginning of the Iraq war (2003 to 2005).28 In the fall of 2005, after
25Matei, ‘The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Romania’, pp.574–85.
26There are still problems and rivalries with regard to cooperation and sharing in a multilateral
format; the bilateral format is still highly preferred. Source: discussions with Romanian
intelligence officers, 2009–10.
27‘Bugetul SRI, SIE, STS a fost suplimentat pt personal’,http://www.ziare.com/stiri/sri/bugetul-
sri-a-fost-suplimentat-pentru-cheltuieli-de-personal-1098667. .
28Some media reports indicated the United States convinced Romania to cooperate in return
for NATO membership. Others suggested all NATO allies and partners signed an agreement
that allowed CIA operations to run everywhere in Europe. Scott Horton, ‘Inside the CIA’s


































numerous ‘Human Rights Watch’ allegations, as well as media ‘fire alarms’,
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe appointed Senator
Dick Marty to investigate ‘alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state
transfers of detainees’ involving member states of the Council of Europe,
including Romania.29 Senator Marty issued two reports to the Council of
Europe, in 2006 and 2007, respectively, which contained accounts of
numerous illegal US detentions and transfers in Europe, including allegations
of involvement of Romania and other countries.30 In response to the
allegations, in 2006, Romania’s Parliament set up an Inquiry Committee,
which, after investigating all the flights between various airports in Romania,
concluded that no CIA secret prisons functioned in Romania during
2003–5.31 In the fall of 2011, Dick Marty issued yet another report
criticizing the parliamentary inquiries launched after his initial reports.32
And, in the winter of the same year, former CIA operatives identified the
location of the alleged CIA’s secret prison in Romania (the Romanian
National Registry Office for Classified Information [ORNISS]). Both
President Traian Basescu and ORNISSS representatives denied this while
Black Site in Bucharest’, Harper’s Magazine, 8 December 2011; Stephen Grey, ‘Secret CIA
Prisons Confirmed by Polish and Romanian Officials’, The Guardian, 7 June 2007; ‘Break the
Silence on CIA Renditions, Urge MEPs’, European Parliament News, Human rights/External
relations, 11 September 2012 ,http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/content/
20120910STO50933/html/Break-the-silence-on-CIA-renditions-urge-MEPs. ; Matt Apuzzo
and Adam Goldman, ‘AP Exclusive: CIA Flight Carried Secret from Gitmo’, Associated Press
Writers, 7 August 2010.
29‘TheCouncil of Europe’s Investigation into Illegal Transfers and SecretDetentions in Europe: A
Chronology’ ,http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/APFeaturesManager/defaultArtSiteView.asp?
ID¼362 . ; ‘Council of Europe: Secret CIA Prisons Confirmed’, 7 June 2007 ,http://www.
hrw.org/en/news/2007/06/07/council-europe-secret-cia-prisons-confirmed. .
30The Marty reports contained testimonies of several active duty and former members of
intelligence services in the US and Europe, as well as analyses of computer ‘data strings’ from
the international flight planning system. The second report contained allegations that US
‘high-value detainees’ (HVD), such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (the alleged 9/11
mastermind), were detained in secret CIA prisons in Poland and Romania, 2003–5, and
that former President Ion Iliescu authorized the secret detentions. In September 2006,
President Bush acknowledged the existence of ‘black sites’ with no indication regarding
specific venues. In addition, in 2007 a report of the European Union (i.e. the European
Parliament) shared the same conclusion vis-à-vis renditions. For detailed information on the
reports, see the following: ‘The Council of Europe’s Investigation into Illegal Transfers and
Secret Detentions in Europe: A Chronology’; ‘“High-Value” Detainees Were Held in Secret
CIA Detention Centres in Poland and Romania, Says PACE Committee’,http://assembly.coe.
int/ASP/Press/StopPressView.asp?ID¼1924 . ; ‘Council of Europe: Secret CIA Prisons
Confirmed’; Carl Ek, ‘Romania: Background and Current Issues’, Congressional Research
Service (CRS) Report, Number RS2257, 23 January 2007, pp.1–6.
31‘Romanian MPs’ Committee Finds No Evidence of CIA Prisoner’, Rompres News Agency,
Bucharest, 16 June 2006.
32‘TheCouncil of Europe’s Investigation into Illegal Transfers and SecretDetentions in Europe: A
Chronology’; ‘Council of Europe: Secret CIA Prisons Confirmed’.


































the CIA has refused to comment.33 On the other hand, surprisingly, during all
this time, while the international media and Human Rights groups were very
vocal about the existence of ‘black sites’ in Romania and other European
countries, and called for thorough investigations of any human rights
violations, the Romanian media seemed to be less aggressive vis-à-vis the
secret prison concern. In the aftermath of all these revelations, it would be
interesting to see whether or not the Romanian parliament will conduct
another investigation, as urged by a Resolution adopted by the European
Parliament on 11 September 2012,34 and whether or not the media will have
any influence in this particular matter.
Analysis of Intelligence Reform in Romania Before and After NATO/EU
Accession
A Framework for Analysis
As previously mentioned, in analyzing the status of intelligence reform in
Romania before and after integration in NATO and EU, this paper will utilize
the civil–military relations framework proposed by Bruneau and Matei,
which advances a ‘tradeoff’ between democratic control, effectiveness, and
efficiency, of security institutions, including intelligence.35
In this conceptual framework, Democratic Civilian Control involves a
wide spectrum of mechanisms including authority over the institutional
control mechanisms that provide direction and guidance for the security
forces, exercised through institutions that range from legal bases that
empower the civilian leadership, to civilian-led organizations such as a
ministry of defense or a civilian-led intelligence agency, parliamentary
committees, and a well-defined chain of authority for civilians to determine
roles and missions. Oversight must be exercised by the civilian leadership to
33CroftonBlack, ‘Romania’sCIAPrison IlluminatesFailureofEuropeanAccountability’,http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/crofton-black/romanias-cia-prison-illum_b_1138961.html. ; ‘CIA
“Secret Prison” Found in Romania – Media Reports’, 9 December 2011 ,http://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/world-europe-16093106. ; Dick Marty, ‘Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of
Detainees InvolvingCouncil of EuropeMember States: SecondReport’, Report of theCommittee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Doc. 11302 rev. 11 June 2007, pp.1–70,http://assembly.
coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/edoc11302.pdf. .
34.‘TheCouncil of Europe’s Investigation into IllegalTransfers andSecretDetentions inEurope:A
Chronology’; ‘“High-Value”DetaineesWereHeld in Secret CIADetentionCentres in Poland and
Romania, Says PACE Committee’.
35For detailed information on the CMR framework see Bruneau and Matei, ‘Towards a New
Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations’, pp.909–29; Thomas
C. Bruneau, Florina Cristiana Matei and Sak Sakoda, ‘National Security Councils: Their
Potential Functions in Democratic Civil-Military Relations’,Defense & Security Analysis 25/3
(2009) pp.255–69. Nevertheless, even if efficiency is a necessary dimension of the CMR
framework, due to methodological challenges inherent in measuring efficiency of the overall
security sector including intelligence, in this paper I will only consider the control and
effectiveness elements of the CMR; Bruneau and Matei (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of
Civil Military Relations.


































keep track of what the security forces do and to ensure they are in fact
following the direction and guidance exercised by formal agencies within the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Informal oversight by domestic
and international civil society organizations is also important, as is the
inculcation of professional norms, which contribute to effectiveness and must
be institutionalized through policies for recruitment, education, training, and
promotion, in accordance with the goals of the democratically elected civilian
leadership.36
Effectiveness in Fulfilling Roles andMissions involves at least the following
three basic requirements: the existence of a plan, such as a strategy or even a
doctrine; the institutionalizing of specific structures and processes to both
formulate the plans and implement them, such as ministries of defense,
national security councils, or other means that facilitate jointness and/or
inter-agency coordination, as well as international cooperation; and
allocation of resources, including political capital, money, and personnel.
Civilian Control and Effectiveness of Intelligence Before and After NATO/
EU Accession
The preceding discussion indicates that, during the first phase, democratic
control/transparency was the main goal for intelligence reform as compared
to effectiveness, to ensure irreversibility from the past and to ensure Romania
joined NATO and EU. Throughout this phase, despite lack of expertise,
Romanian policy makers, due to pressure by NATO/EU and media scandals,
were more inclined to set aside differences, learn about defense, security, and
intelligence, and undertake reform, especially with regard to control and
oversight. Throughout the second phase, while openness and outreach
initiated by the agencies continued, and effectiveness strengthened (especially
after 9/11), control and oversight was weakened by the legislature.
A summary of findings, in terms of Requirements for Transparency and
Accountability and Requirements for Effectiveness during the two phases, is
presented in Table 1. All six intelligence agencies operating in Romania are
taken into account, based on available information and access. Values are
assigned ranging from low to high for each requirement in order to highlight
some of the similarities and variations between the two phases.
Requirements for Democratic Control
Romania scores ‘Medium-High’ in the Institutional Control Mechanisms
category during both pre- and post-NATO/EU integration period. Control
Mechanisms have been institutionalized through a relatively rich legal
framework, varying from organic laws to rules and regulations on national
security and intelligence, as well as institutions, to include civilian-led
agencies such as SRI, SIE and CSAT, and CNI, seeking to achieve
36See Bruneau and Tollefson, Who Guards the Guardians; Bruneau and Boraz (eds.)
Reforming Intelligence; Bruneau et al., ‘National Security Councils’, pp.255–69.































































































































































































































































































accountability and transparency of the agencies, along with effectiveness and
better coordination and sharing. Of great importance has been the increased
understanding of the intelligence agencies’ managers of the need to balance
secrecy with openness, and the importance of informing outsiders of the need
for intelligence in a democracy, a difficult task considering that the post-
communist Romanian intelligence started with total secrecy, and people’s
mistrust due to the legacy of the past.37 Nevertheless, in the long run,
openness and outreach were not impossible. Some agencies became more
open than others. SRI was the first to open, as it had no option other than to
show people it was not the Securitate (which people associated and
occasionally still associate it with). Although almost all SRI and SIE directors
had encouraged transparency via websites and declassification of
information, gave interviews, and even started partnerships with civil
society, for example, the partnership between SRI and civil society launched
in 2003, and even more openness was noticed after Maior and Ungureanu
took office respectively at SRI and SIE after NATO/EU integration. This
openness led to more awareness of the public on intelligence and even
support, starting with support in the media, for intelligence activity.38
Foreign/military intelligence remain more secluded than the SRI, yet are now
more transparent and open than during the first phase, for example, DGIA is
issuing a journal on intelligence and while representatives of DGIA
contributed papers and presented at the 2011 ISA. Romania however scores
‘Medium-High’ due to the previously-mentioned irregularities within the
legal framework and the need for improving transparency, especially
regarding outreach to academia.39
In the ‘oversight’ category Romania scores ‘Medium-High’ during the first
period and ‘Low’ during the second. To begin with, legislative oversight was,
admittedly, more rigorous and effective before 2004, when Romania’s
membership into NATO and EU as well as NATO/EU accession requirements
became the ‘only game in town’ for the Romanians. During that time any
political divergences were put aside for the sake of NATO/EU integration,
and lawmakers attached greater importance to both transparency and the
effectiveness of Romanian intelligence. Now the politicians manifest a
‘hands-off’ attitude toward intelligence as we saw with the National Security
Law package. The judiciary has been weak throughout both phases, due to
corruption and limited understanding and knowledge of intelligence and
37In addition, even when some agencies have showed interest and took action to open to the
civil society and the public, occasional ‘deterrence’ actions undertaken by other agencies’
leadership toward the press in order to halt investigative journalism or publication of
inconvenient materials, has been a hindrance to intelligence transparency, garnering of
popular support, as well as improving the outsiders’ intelligence culture.
38Support for intelligence may also indirectly stem from citizens’ support for Romania’s
participation in international military operations.
39Valentin Fernand Filip and Remus Ioan Stefureac, ‘The Dilemmas of Linking Romanian
Intelligence, Universities, and Think Tanks’, International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence 24/4 (2011–2012) pp.711–32.


































security issues, but also the faulty legal framework. The current diminutive
political will to consolidate and strengthen democratic control and oversight
of intelligence agencies is largely due to the disappearance of EU/NATO
‘carrots’ and to a certain extent ‘sticks’. Schengen could be a stick but
political unsteadiness and the economic crisis which affected Romania badly
and elicited budgetary cuts to Government salaries hinder progress. With no
interest or incentive for reform on the one hand, and no ‘veto’ from the EU or
NATO on the other, it is rather difficult to predict whether or not oversight of
intelligence by the legislature and even judiciary will become more robust in
the foreseeable future. Hopefully, now that the NATO/EU incentives have
virtually vanished, the media will continue to watch the intelligence agencies
to ensure a balance between security and transparency is maintained in
Romania. This leads us to the ‘informal’ dimension of control and oversight.
Informal oversight by the media has been high since 1989, although,
arguably, it may have had more power to sway policy and reform prior
NATO/EU integration than after. Nevertheless, it needs to remain alert and
reveal corruption and wrongdoing related to intelligence.
Professional norms, too, improved since 1989 and Romania scores ‘High’
in this category in both phases. Intelligence agencies have become
professional institutions, based on expertise, responsibility, and corporate-
ness. There are still issues that affect improving professionalism; again, due to
limited interest of legislators. For example, notwithstanding the remarkable
progress of the SRI reform in certain areas, for example, planning,
management, and restructuring, which basically happened as SRI and CSAT
bypassed the outdated 1991 Security Law, the reform of additional SRI levels
such as demilitarization, which calls for a separate law on the status of
intelligence officers and a career guide for the intelligence practitioners,
requires further regulations.
Requirements for Effectiveness
Effectiveness of intelligence equated with Romania’s desire to be seen as
reliable security partner, especially after 9/11, and also due to NATO
membership. For instance, Romania scores ‘Low-Medium’ during Phase 1
and ‘Medium-High’ during Phase 2 in the ‘plan’ category. More strategic
documents have been issued after 2004 as compared to the 1989–2004
timeframe, aimed at strengthening Romania’s intelligence capabilities to fight
against terrorism, organized crime, and other security challenges, as well as
increasing effectiveness when participating in international military and
peace support operations.
In the ‘institution’ category, Romania scores ‘Medium’ during the first
phase and ‘Medium-High’ during the second. Perhaps the most plausible
explanation for the shift from ‘Medium’ to ‘Medium-High’ would be the
creation of the CNI in 2005, aimed at improving intelligence sharing and
analysis across the intelligence community.
In the ‘resources’ category, Romania scores ‘Medium’ during the first phase
and ‘Medium-High’ during the second. Since Romania’s participation in the


































international efforts to counter terrorism and integration into NATO,
allocating more resources in terms of budget, personnel, and equipment, has
become a priority, at least for the executive. With regard to budget, for
example, of all EU member states, Romania allocates one of the highest
funding to the intelligence agencies,40 even in the current conditions of
economic crisis. Likewise, the Romanian intelligence agencies have
continuously sought to recruit qualified personnel and modern equipment
to augment agencies’ capabilities. Romania’s IC effective contribution to
both national and global security has been acknowledged on numerous
occasions by foreign counterparts. In recognition of Romania’s excellent
military intelligence Humint capabilities, for example, NATO established in
2009 a NATO Humint Center of Excellence in Oradea, Romania. Currently,
the presence of US rotating military training bases in Romania, as well as US
plans to deploy a missile shield in Romania as part of the US anti-missile
defense system in Europe, project START, will probably require and actually
contribute to strengthening the effectiveness of Romania’s security forces,
including intelligence.
Conclusions: Lessons Learned from Romania’s Intelligence Reform
This article looks at Romania’s endeavors to reform intelligence after the fall
of the communist regime in December 1989, from the perspective of pre- and
post-NATO/EU accession. It finds that reforming intelligence – finding a
proper balance between democratic civilian control and effectiveness – has
been long and difficult in Romania, but progress was not impossible.
Admittedly, the former Securitate ‘stigma’ has faded away. It is replaced by an
intelligence system with redefined democratic roles and missions, more
transparent, less politicized, and engaged in international cooperation; thus
better serving Romania’s citizens and national security.
Nevertheless, Romania is, at the same time, both a ‘best’ and ‘worst’ example
of democratic reform of intelligence. On the one hand, aswas the case formany
other Central and Eastern European countries, NATO and the EU were the
major drivers of intelligence reform. The pre-NATO/EU integration phase is the
period when despite limited knowledge and expertise vis-à-vis intelligence and
security on the part of both policy makers and even intelligence professionals,
therewas almost unanimouswillingness to undertake reform, in order to secure
membership in these two organizations. And, if reforming intelligence stopped
for one reason or another, it was the media that stepped in and brought reform
back. During the pre-NATO/EU integration period, transparency dominated
the reform, while effectiveness became increasingly relevant after 2001. During
the post-NATO/EU integration period, however, effectiveness became themain
focus of the reform and has followed a more or less constant trajectory after
2004; control, especially oversight, has plummeted, due precisely to the lack of
‘carrots and sticks’ of NATO/EU, which has led to decreased willingness/
40For detailed information of the SRI, SIE, SPP, STS budgets, see the following newspaper
compilation: ,http://www.ziare.com/articole/bugetþsri ..


































interest41 on the part of responsible policy and decision makers within the
legislature to continue intelligence reform after accession. As The Economist
contends: ‘in promoting democracy, the EU has less influence onmembers than
on applicants. As one diplomat says: “To join the EU you have to smell of roses.
But if youare amember andyou start to reek, there is nobody tomake you take a
bath”’.42
Thus, 20 years after the end of communism, the ‘effectiveness/democratic
control’ balance is heavily towards ‘effectiveness’ in Romania. One could
sensibly argue this is a natural trend of old and new democracies alike,
considering the complex and unpredictable security environment which calls
for effective intelligence agencies. Nevertheless, bearing in mind Romania’s
non-democratic experience with intelligence, democratic civilian control
should not remain a low priority. Old democracies continue to strengthen
control and oversee institutions to keep intelligence accountable and so should
Romania. Yet, the lack of political will after NATO/EU integration could not
only diminish Romania’s credibility among NATO and EU if it fails to
maintain transparent and accountable state institutions, as pledged before
accession, but could also negatively impact democratic consolidation.43 All of
this could be a ‘warning’ for civilian elites in all democracies (both old and
new) that political will and interest should remain cardinal in maintaining a
continuum of democratic civilian control and effectiveness of the intelligence.
Hopefully, thingswill get better in Romania, if/when theGovernment changes
and if the new civilian elites will attach greater interest to intelligence reform.
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